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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
EQUITABLE LIFE & C~-\.SUALTY 
INSl-;-RANCE CO~IPANY, 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
STATE T~\X COni~IISSION OF 
rTAH, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 780~ 
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts as set 
forth in Petitioner's brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
RELIED ON BY RESPONDENT 
I. 
THE BURDEN IMPOSED BY A TAX STATUTE ON A 
PARTICULAR TAXPAYER DOES NOT PERMIT A CON-
STRUCTION WHICH A VOIDS ITS CLEAR INTENT. 
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II. 
THE STATUTORY PROVISION IS CLEAR THAT AN 
EXAMINATION FEE SHALL BE DEDUCTIBLE FROM THE 
INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX ONLY IN THE YEAR IT IS 
PAID. 
III. 
IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS STATUTORY AU-
THORITY CREDITS CARRIED FORWARD TO SUBSEQUENT 
YEARS MUST BE DISALLOWED. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE BURDEN IMPOSED BY A TAX STATUTE ON A 
PARTICULAR TAXPAYER DOES NOT PERMIT A CON-
STRUCTION WHICH AVOIDS ITS CLEAR INTENT. 
The argument of petitioner addresses itself, at some 
length, to the inequity of permitting a governing body 
to i1npose the burdensome costs of an insurance examina-
tion upon a small company. (Pet. Br.; 5, 6 and 7) This 
rationale is in criticism of the statute imposing the ex-
amination fee, which statute we are concerned with only 
collaterally. The argument as set forth does not affect 
Section 43-14-4 (3) Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as 
amended, which is directly in issue. This pertinent statute 
to a considerable extent mitigates the burden on the tax-
payer by allowing a deduction of at least a portion of 
the examination fee paid from the insurance premium 
tax. 
It may well be contended that the insurance premium 
tax is greatly in excess of the tax which is ordinarily 
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3 
charged on profits and licenses. ~uch a contention ~hould 
not be detenninative in this case. In Intermountain T,itle 
Guaranty Company r. State Ta:r Commission, 107 Utah 
2:2:2, where the insurance preu1iun1 tax was under direct 
challenge, this court said : 
"The fixing of tax rates is a legislative func-
tion and not that of this court. 
"\Ye cannot subscribe to plaintiff's conten-
tion that the rate as fixed is confiscatory, espe-
cially in view of the provisions in Section 43-3-7 
(now subsection 3 of -13-1-1--1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, as amended) that 'the taxes and fees 
as provided herein shall be in lieu of all other 
state, county and municipal licenses and fees of 
every kind and character.'" 
\Ve concur with petitioner's statement (P. 8, Pet. 
Br.) "the n1ere fact legislation may be unfair or inequit-
able in its application to a particular taxpayer or class 
of taxpayers does not by that fact make it invalid if it 
does not in fact violate constitutional provisions or gene-
ral statutory limitations." The question here is not one 
of statutory validity but of statutory construction. 
There is no common law of state taxation: each ex-
action must derive its authority from some statute. 
Statutes are merely written language and of course sub-
ject to all the frailties and defects of language. Legisla-
tive commands, especially in the tax field, must be 
couched in colloquial language with flexible or changing 
meaning. Coutts alone may in the end declare what the 
statute means. 
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The adherence to the literal words of a statute is a 
permissable form of interpretation but it is not an in-
exorable necessity. This court in Norville v. State Tax 
Commission, 98 Utah 170, quoting Ozawa v. U.S., 260 U.S. 
178, said: 
"We may then look to the reason of the en-
actment and inquire into its antecedent history 
and give it effect in accordance with its design 
and purpose, sacrificing, if necessary, the literal 
meaning in order that the purpose may not fail." 
Statutory language always poses a challenge. A realistic 
rule by Judge Learned Hand in laying bare the diffi-
culties of interpreting tax statutes has made a lasting 
contribution to realistic jurisprudence. He has come to 
the forefront of those who have broken away from the 
narrow and traditional viewpoint of construing tax stat-
utes by resolving all doubts against the tax authority. 
The heart of the approach to the complex task of constru-
ing tax statutes can best be summarized in Judge Hand's 
attitude expressed in Van Braken v. Helvering, 115 Fed. 
2d 709 at 711 cert. denied, 313 U.S. 585: 
"Indeed nothing is so likely to lead us astray 
as an abject reliance upon canons of any sort; 
so much the whole history of verbal interpreta-
tion teaches if it teaches anything. At times one 
is more likely to reach the truth by an unanalyzed 
and intuitive conclusion from the text as a whole, 
than by following, step by step, the accredited 
guides." 
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5 
The power to tax being the Ia w n1aker's nwst vital 
power, n1ust prevail over contrary personal view~ as 
to the social benefits or econmnic desirability of any 
given exaction. 
II. 
THE STATUTORY PROVISION IS CLEAR THAT AN 
EXAMINATION FEE SHALL BE DEDUCTIBLE FROM THE 
INSURANCE PREMIUM TAX ONLY IN THE YEAR IT IS 
PAID. 
The statute to be construed in this case was enacted 
during the legislative session of 1947. Prior to that time 
the taxation of insurance companies was under Section 
43-3-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended. This 
section enacting the insurance premium tax provided: · 
"That if any insurance company shall have 
paid a property tax in the state of Utah during 
said year, it shall be entitled to deduct from the 
tax herein provided for the amount of such prop-
erty tax paid for general purposes." 
There can be no question but that the words "during said 
year" modify the word "paid" in that sentence for the 
reason that it is an adverbial clause stating when, and 
the only verb in the clause is "paid," so that it must of 
necessity be referred to that verb. When the legislature 
amended the law in 1947, the only amendment, as far as 
this phrase is concerned, is that part of the statute which 
we have italicized hereafter: 
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"'If any insurance cmnpany shall have paid 
a property tax in the state of Utah or any fee for 
('.rmnination required by this code during said 
year, it shall be entitled to deduct from the tax 
herein provided for the amount of such property 
tax paid for general state purposes, and the 
amount of any such examination fee." 
It is to be noted then that the statute reads the same 
except that in addition to allowing a deduction for prop-
erty tax, it also allows a deduction for "any fee for ex-
amination required by this code." The words "tax and 
fee" are compound objects of the verb "paid," and the 
words "for examination required by this code" modify 
the word "fee." Since the words "during said year" in 
the statute prior to 1947 modify "paid," it is a logical 
conclusion that the legislature intended these words to 
modify "paid" in the statute of 1947 so that the meaning 
of the statute is that an insurance company may deduct 
from the insurance premiu1n tax "a property tax" or 
"any fee for examination required by this code" paid 
"during said year." 
It appears then that the intent of the legislature 
in amending the particular section of the law was to 
allow an insurance company, not only to deduct the prop-
erty taxes in the state of Utah, paid during said year, 
but also to deduct the costs of any fees or examinations 
required by the insurance code, paid during said year. 
The court should, therefore, if there be any ambiguity 
in the statute, make an interpretation of the law which 
gives effect to the intent of the legislature. 
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III. 
IN THE ABSENCE OF EXPRESS STATUTORY AU-
THORITY CREDITS CARRIED FORWARD TO SUBSEQUENT 
YEARS l\Il'ST BE DISALLOWED. 
The privilege to offset or deduct the examination 
fee did not exist prior to the enactment of -t-3-14--l: (3) 
rtah Code ~\nnotated, 19-!3, as amended. That privilege 
cannot be extended by the desire of the taxpayer. The 
statute is plain and unambiguous. If it should be amend-
ed, to resolve existing inequities, that duty lies with the 
legislature and not with administrative bodies or the 
courts. 
The effect of allowing the Petitioner herein to make 
the deduction claimed may well result in his escaping 
the obligation of paying any taxes whatsoever for a 
period of years, and is in the nature of an exemption. 
·•* * * Statutes exempting taxpayers from a 
general taxing statute are construed strictly 
against those who are seeking to escape the tax 
burden." Stillman v. Lynch, 56 U. 5'40; Parker v. 
Quinn, 23 U. 332; Norville v. State Tax Commis-
sion, 98 U. 170. 
"The fundamental authority of the tax struc-
ture of several states is that all taxable property 
should bear its fair share of the costs and ex-
penses of government; and while property is tax-
able only when declared so by legislative enact-
ment, the law does not read into the taxing stat-
utes any implied exemption of any particular 
property or particular property owners, unless 
the intendment of the statute to make an exemp-
tion is plain. When the statute purports to grant 
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an exeinption, the universal rule of construction 
is that the tax exemption provision is to be con-
strued strictly against the one who asserts the 
claiin of the exemption, in the absence of ex-
pressed legislative intent that the exemption is 
to he construed otherwise, or have anything to 
indicate that the purpose of the exemption was to 
secure equality of assessment. An exemption from 
taxation must be clearly defined and founded 
upon plain language without doubt or ambiguity." 
65 American Juris prudence Taxation 524, Page 
526. 
Although we have been talking of exemption from 
taxation, the same doctrine applies to a credit against 
a tax or, as otherwise stated, a deduction. 
"Deductions made in determining taxable in-
come is in fact an 'exemption.' An exemption 
must be strictly construed against the exemption-
ist." Tupelo Garment Company of Tupelo v. 
State Tax Commission, (l\fississippi) 173 South-
ern 656, 178 l\fiss. 730. 
l\Ir. Justice Cordozo in Woodford Realty v. Rose, 286 
U.S. 319, where the court had before it the question of al-
lowing a loss deductible from income taxes to be carried 
forward as a credit in a. subsequent year, said: 
"A taxpayer who seeks an allowance for loss-
es suffered in an earlier year, must be able to point 
to a specific provision of the statute permitting 
the deduction and must bring himself within its 
terms. Unless he can do this, the operations of 
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the current Year n1ust be the 1ueasure of his bur-
den." Bllrn~t v. Sanford & Brooks Com Jlllii.IJ, ~S~ 
r.s. 359 at 363. 
This view was again forcibly stated in the ease of 
~llartin 1'. Commissioner of Internal Rerenue, 61 Fed. ~<l 
9-12, where the court declared: 
"The statute li1niting the thing to be done in a 
particular mode includes the negative of any other 
mode. • * * Ordinarily, losses are deductible only 
in the year in which they are sustained. * * * The 
general principle underlying income tax statutes 
since the 16th amendment was adopted has been 
a computation of gains and losses on the basis 
of annual accounting for the transactions of the 
year. * * * In order to support a right to deduct 
over a period of years a loss sustained in a par-
ticular year, there must be some authority there-
for in the statute permitting the deduction, or 
otherwise general principles of an annual account-
ing for tax purposes must be applied." 
In Reed r. Commissioner, 129 Fed. 2d 908 at 912, 
the court reviewed the existing law on deductions and 
stated: 
"~Ioreover, deductions are not a matter of 
right but of legislative grace, so that the burden 
is on the taxpayer to bring his case squarely with-
in the precise terms of the statute." 
White v. U. S. 305 U. S. 281 at 292; 
New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 
435 at 440; 
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Geoday Enterprises v. Commissioner, 126 
Fed. 2d 386; 
Blenheim Co. v. Commissioner, 125 Fed. 2d 
906. 
vVhile these cases are not concerned with an insur-
ance premium tax, they are clearly illustrative of the 
accounting principles which should be applied in the case 
at bar. This tax is clearly conceived on annual accounting 
principles. Section 43-14-4 provides: 
"Every insurance company engaged in the 
transaction of business in this state shall pay to 
the State Tax Commission on or before the 31st 
day of March in each year; (1) a tax of two and 
one-fourth (214) per cent of the total premiums 
received by it during the next preceding calendar 
year* * *." 
Carrying a credit for examination fees paid in one 
year forward to subsequent years is a departure from 
sound accounting principles not authorized by the statute 
we are construing. 
CONCLUSION 
It is urged on this Honorable Court that looking to 
the reason of the statutory enactment and its antecedent 
provisions, the construction contended for by the Re-
spondent, Tax Commission, is proper-namely, that fees 
paid for examinations required by the insurance code can 
only be deducted from the premimum tax during the 
same year that the fee was paid. 
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If a doubt is present in determining the 1neaning of 
the statute, that doubt 1nust be resolved against the tax-
payer because its burden was to bring itself within a 
statutory provision allowing the offset to be carried 
forward. In the absence of language (and there is none) 
in the statute which would expressly allow the deduction 
of the examination fee to be carried forward, this court 
should have no hesitancy in declaring that the time when 
the credit is to be effective is the time of payment. There 
is nothing in the statute indicating an intention to re-
duce the amount of the premium tax for successive years, 
rather the clear intent is to reduce the annual tax only 
by the sum of the current examination fee paid by the 
msurance company. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THOMAS C. CUTHBERT, 
Attorney for Respondent. 
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